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for the parties to unilaterally override the negotiated treaty
rates in specified circumstances. Previewed last year in proposed
form—a first for the U.S. Treasury1—these mechanisms work as
kill-switches, partially terminating the treaty as to one or both
treaty partners. The idea is to forestall a more problematic out-
come, such as an enduring breach of one of the parties’ expecta-
tions, or the opposite, a complete termination of all the treaty
terms in the face of such a breach.
These kill-switch provisions are not yet in operation via nego-
tiated treaties, and the terms will no doubt evolve when put in
practice. Examining the current language, however, will help ex-
plain the motivations and precedent for introducing these
measures and how they might represent a new vision for tax
treaties. That is the aim of this article.
Part I outlines the context for the proposed introduction of kill-
switches in the U.S. Model Income Tax Convention. Part II ex-
plores the international precedents for such provisions and com-
pares them to the proposed language. Part III analyzes the po-
litical and legal implications of incorporating these provisions
into general treaty practice. The article concludes that, besides
altering key procedural formalities typically involved in treaty
formation, kill-switch clauses set the stage for a fundamental
shift in the scope and purpose of tax treaties going forward.
I. CONTEXT AND IMPETUS FOR REFORM
Most observers of the international tax order point to the
model tax conventions and guidance of the Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the United
Nations as two transnational sources of global tax norms.2 The
1. SELECT DRAFT PROVISIONS OF THE U.S. MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION
(U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY 2015) [hereinafter SELECT DRAFT PROVISIONS],
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Docu-
ments/Treaty-Special-Tax-Regimes-5-20-2015.pdf; SELECT DRAFT PROVISIONS
OF THE U.S. MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION: NEW ARTICLE 28 (U.S. DEP’T OF
THE TREASURY 2015) [hereinafter DRAFT PROVISIONS: ARTICLE 28],
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Docu-
ments/Treaty-Subsequent-Changes-in-Law-5-20-2015.pdf.
2. See MODEL CONVENTION WITH RESPECT TO TAXES ON INCOME AND ON
CAPITAL (ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. 2014); U.N. MODEL DOUBLE
TAXATION CONVENTION BETWEEN DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
(U.N. DEP’T OF ECON. & SOCIAL AFFAIRS 2011); see also REUVEN S. AVI-YONAH,
INTERNATIONAL TAX AS INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF THE
INTERNATIONAL TAX REGIME (2007); HUGH J. AULT & BRIAN J. ARNOLD,
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United States, however, has long had its own Model Income Tax
Convention, the newest version of which is formally referred to
as the United States Model Income Tax Convention of February
17, 2016 (“U.S. Model”).3 The U.S. Model is structurally very
similar to the OECD and U.N. Models, yet stands alone as a con-
veyer of certain tax policy standards specific to the United
States.4
The U.S. Treasury periodically updates the U.S. Model, gener-
ally to reflect policy changes that have been introduced into bi-
lateral treaties on a piecemeal basis.5 The immediate predeces-
sor to the current U.S. Model was the United States Model In-
come Tax Convention of November 23, 2006 (“2006 U.S.
Model”).6 The U.S. Model is heavily influential given the im-
portance of the United States in global markets; thus, the addi-
tion of kill-switch provisions may well impact the treaty policies
of other nations.
The U.S. Treasury’s decision to release proposed updates in
draft form and invite public comment is unusual. Rather than
reflect a landscape that has already evolved, it seems to signal a
coming change. This Part explores the context for a possible pol-
icy shift by briefly outlining the U.S. Treasury’s reasons for mak-
ing the proposals, and then examines the two kill-switch provi-
sions in their proposed and final forms.
A. The Problem to be Solved
The timing of the proposed changes to the U.S. Model appear
to be designed as a way to globalize U.S. policy preferences in
COMPARATIVE INCOME TAXATION: A STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS 347–350 (2d ed.
2004).
3. U.S.MODEL INCOMETAXCONVENTION (U.S.DEP’TOF THETREASURY 2016)
[hereinafter 2016 U.S. MODEL].
4. For example, the United States only provides for foreign tax credits as
a method for relieving double taxation, while the OECD provides for both credit
and exemption methods. For a discussion, see Allison Christians, Tax Treaties
for Investment and Aid to Sub-Saharan Africa: A Case Study, 71 BROOK. L.
REV. 639 (2005).
5. New models also address contemporary exigencies of business and in-
vestment, which may have impacted the treaty relationship. See, e.g., Walter
F. O’Connor, A Comparative Analysis of the 1981 and 1996 U.S. Model Income
Tax Treaties, 24 INT’L TAX J., no. 4, 1998, at 9 (“Renovation of tax treaties has
generally been a response to new developments in the business world.”).
6. U.S.MODEL INCOMETAXCONVENTION (U.S.DEP’TOF THETREASURY 2006)
[hereinafter 2006 U.S. MODEL].
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the context of the OECD’s ongoing project to counter “base ero-
sion and profit shifting” (BEPS).7 The BEPS project timeline in-
cluded the release of action plans by the end of 2015. The OECD
duly released fifteen action plans laying out minimum stand-
ards, recommendations, and best practices agreed to by its mem-
bers and non-OECD “BEPS Associate” countries.8 By releasing
proposed model treaty provisions in the fall of 2015, the United
States ensured that its policy plans would be reflected in these
OECD documents.
The U.S. Model proposals purport to target so-called “double
non-taxation,” which loosely refers to a situation (generally cre-
ated by treaty) whereby income normally subject to tax in at
least one jurisdiction ends up being subject to tax in neither (and
possibly nowhere at all at the entity level). The general issue is
that taxpayers combine reduced source-based withholding rates
granted in a treaty with favorable domestic tax regimes to elim-
inate taxation at the entity level by both (or multiple) countries.
This issue has been a driving force of the BEPS initiative and is
reflected in many of the action plans, with special attention in
those directed at countering treaty abuse.9
In the draft Technical Explanations accompanying the pro-
posed provisions, the U.S. Treasury explains that the existing
U.S. treaty network can at times operate to “facilitate” BEPS,
and the proposed changes are a direct attempt to combat
7. See, e.g., Laura Davison & Kevin A. Bell, U.S. Proposed Changes to
Model Tax Treaty Intended to Influence BEPS Discussions, 98 DAILY TAX REP.
G-6 (2015); see also J.P. Finet, ABA Meeting: U.S. Model Tax Treaty Proposals
Were Meant to InfluenceOECD, 79 TAXNOTES INT’L 1103 (2015) (reporting that
Quyen Huynh, U.S. Treasury associate international tax counsel, stated that
“the L[imitation] O[n] B[enefits] approach is the U.S.’s preferred method for
addressing treaty abuse and that [the U.S.] Treasury wanted to influence some
of the discussions at the OECD with the release of the proposed revisions to
the U.S. model treaty.”).
8. For an overview of the fifteen action plans, see ORG. FOR ECON. CO-
OPERATION&DEV. [OECD], EXECUTIVE SUMMARIES: 2015 FINAL REPORT (2015),
https://www.oecd.org/ctp/beps-reports-2015-executive-summaries.pdf.
9. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. [OECD], PREVENTING THE
GRANTING OF TREATY BENEFITS IN INAPPROPRIATE CIRCUMSTANCES, ACTION 6 -
2015 FINAL REPORT 9 (2015) [hereinafter ACTION 6 FINAL REPORT] (“Taxpayers
engaged in treaty shopping and other treaty abuse strategies undermine tax
sovereignty by claiming treaty benefits in situations where these benefits were
not intended to be granted, thereby depriving countries of tax revenues.”).
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abuses.10 Of course, using treaties to accomplish double non-tax-
ation is hardly a new phenomenon, and this is not the first time
the United States has released Model Treaty language designed
to address it. Every U.S. Model Treaty has included various anti-
abuse rules, and U.S. lawmakers have long deliberated over the
proper scope of safeguards.11
The proposed provisions accordingly addressed five issue ar-
eas: (i) exempt permanent establishments,12 (ii) “special tax re-
gimes,”13 (iii) subsequent changes in law,14 (iv) revisions to the
Limitation on Benefits (LOB) provisions,15 and (v) “expatriated
entities.”16 The provisions interact in various ways.
The focus of this article is on proposals (ii) and (iii): special tax
regimes and subsequent-law changes. Each proposal introduces
a kill-switch for treaty withholding rates, in effect overriding or
partially terminating the treaty in the event a treaty partner
adopts certain provisions in its domestic law. These provisions
have already been incorporated as U.S.-initiated proposals in
the OECD’s Action Plan 6: 2015 Final Report, “Preventing the
10. Technical Explanations are interpretive documents developed by the
U.S. Treasury to explain tax treaty provisions. For a list of recent treaties and
explanations, see Resource Center – Treaties and TIEAs, TREASURY.GOV,
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Pages/trea-
ties.aspx (last visited July 23, 2016).
11. For an early assessment based on the first U.S. Model Tax Convention,
see Robert R. Oliva, The Treasury’s Twenty Year Battle with Treaty Shopping:
Article 16 of the 1977 United States Model Treaty, 14 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.
293 (1984).
12. SELECTDRAFT PROVISIONS OF THEU.S. MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION:
NEWARTICLE 1, PARA. 7 (U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY 2015), https://www.treas-
ury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Documents/Treaty-Exempt-Perma-
nent-Establishments-5-20-2015.pdf.
13. SELECTDRAFT PROVISIONS, supra note 1, art. 3, para 1(l).
14. DRAFT PROVISIONS: ARTICLE 28, supra note 1.
15. SELECTDRAFT PROVISIONS OF THEU.S. MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION:
NEW ARTICLE 22 (U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY 2015) [hereinafter DRAFT
PROVISIONS: ARTICLE 22], https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-pol-
icy/treaties/Documents/Treaty-Limitation-on-Benefits-5-20-2015.pdf. The pro-
visions impact different categories of income and cover distinct situations, as
discussed more fully below.
16. SELECT DRAFT PROVISIONS OF THE U.S. MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION
(2015), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Docu-
ments/Treaty-Payments-by-Expatriated-Entities-5-20-2015.pdf (containing
articles 10, 11, 21, and 21).
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Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances.”17
This means that the inclusion of such provisions is now on the
table for inclusion in a multilateral tax instrument to be coordi-
nated by the OECD. Each provision is discussed in turn.
B. Special Tax Regimes
A special tax regime, under the proposed definition, is a pre-
scribed set of circumstances that entitles an income recipient to
a “preferential” effective tax rate in the person’s home jurisdic-
tion.18 The treaty then denies certain benefits where a person
makes a specified payment to a “connected person” who is eligi-
ble for a special tax regime.19
17. ACTION 6 FINALREPORT, supra note 9, at 96 (“A State that has . . . BEPS
concerns with respect to certain features of the domestic law of a prospective
treaty partner or with respect to changes that might be made after the conclu-
sion of a tax treaty may want to protect its tax base against such risks and may
therefore find it useful to include in its treaties provisions that would restrict
treaty benefits with respect to taxpayers that benefit from certain preferential
tax rules or with respect to certain drastic changes that could be made to a
country’s domestic law after the conclusion of a treaty. [The included] pro-
posals seek to achieve this objective.”).
18. SELECT DRAFT PROVISIONS, supra note 1, art. 3, para 1(l), at 3 (“[A]ny
legislation, regulation or administrative practice that provides a preferential
effective rate of taxation to such income or profit, including through reductions
in the tax rate or the tax base,” as modified by listed inclusions and exclu-
sions.).
19. In proposed form, consistent with prior treaty language, the U.S. Treas-
ury used the term “related person.” In the U.S. Model, the term has been re-
placed by “connected person” both in the context of the special tax regime pro-
visions and elsewhere. Article 3 explains that:
[T]wo persons shall be “connected persons” if one owns, di-
rectly or indirectly, at least 50 percent of the beneficial inter-
est in the other (or, in the case of a company, at least 50 per-
cent of the aggregate vote and value of the company’s shares)
or another person owns, directly or indirectly, at least 50 per-
cent of the beneficial interest (or, in the case of a company, at
least 50 percent of the aggregate vote and value of the com-
pany’s shares) in each person. In any case, a person shall be
connected to another if, based on all the relevant facts and
circumstances, one has control of the other or both are under
the control of the same person or persons.
2016 U.S. MODEL, supra note 3, art. 3, para. 1(m).
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For example, imagine that TreatyCo is a company that is a tax
resident of a treaty country. As such, TreatyCo is normally eli-
gible for the treaty rate for income earned from U.S. sources.
Taking the stated rate in the U.S. Model, for example, TreatyCo
would generally pay 15 percent in tax on interest it received from
a U.S. borrower20 and no U.S. tax on a royalty received from a
U.S. source;21 it would also pay no U.S. tax on any U.S. source
income not otherwise dealt with in the treaty.22 TreatyCo, how-
ever, would be denied these rates and subjected instead to the
regular U.S. rates (generally 30 percent) if TreatyCo is related
to the payor of the income item and the income item is subject to
a tax that meets the definition of a special tax regime.
In proposed form, all that appeared to be needed for a special
tax regime to exist was a “reduction” in the tax rate or tax base
as to specified types of income, which could occur pursuant to a
law or regulation or by administrative practice, such as a private
letter ruling. By way of example, the U.S. Treasury identified a
special tax regime where a residence state gives a taxpayer a
ruling that lowers the tax rate on its foreign-source interest in-
come relative to the rate that residents of that state would gen-
erally pay.23 The terms of the definition and example implies
that the level of reduction would be irrelevant, making it likely
that clarity on this issue will be provided in the form of treaty-
based guidance.24
In proposed form, the new U.S. Model and the multilateral
treaty envisioned under BEPS Action Plan 15 (assuming the
U.S. proposals are adopted by the OECD)25 would have denied
20. Id. art. 11.
21. Id. art. 13.
22. Id. art. 21.
23. SELECTDRAFT PROVISIONS, supra note 1, art. 3, at 3.
24. The U.S. Treasury typically issues administrative guidance regarding
the U.S. Model and its bilateral tax treaties in the form of Technical Explana-
tions, which provide explanations as to the meaning and purpose of the various
provisions. See, e.g., TECHNICAL EXPLANATION ACCOMPANYING THE UNITED
STATES MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION OF NOV. 15, 2006 (U.S. DEP’T OF THE
TREASURY 2006), https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Docu-
ments/hp16802.pdf. It should be noted, however, that Technical Explanations
are regulatory guidance rather than bilateral instruments, and they are not
always adhered to by U.S. courts.
25. See ACTION 6 FINAL REPORT, supra note 9, at 96 (“When these new ver-
sions of the United States proposals were discussed, it was agreed that they
should be further examined once finalised by the United States in the light of
the comments that will be received on them. For that reason, the proposals
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the treaty rate on interest, royalties, and “other income” to any
recipient entitled to a special tax regime where the recipient is
related to the payor of the income.26 The treaty withholding rates
were to be preserved for other taxpayers. Thus, Articles 11, 12,
and 21 were to include the following new paragraphs, respec-
tively:
New Article 11(2)(c) (Interest): interest arising in a Contract-
ing State and beneficially owned by a resident of the other Con-
tracting State that is related to the payor of the interest may
be taxed in the first-mentioned Contracting State in accord-
ance with domestic law if such resident is subject to a special
tax regime with respect to interest in its Contracting State of
residence at any time during the taxable period in which the
interest is paid;27
New Article 12(5)(a) (Royalties): royalties arising in a Con-
tracting State and beneficially owned by a resident of the other
Contracting State that is related to the payor of the royalty
may be taxed in the first-mentioned Contracting State in ac-
cordance with domestic law if such resident is subject to a spe-
cial tax regime with respect to royalties in its Contracting State
of residence at any time during the taxable period in which the
royalties are paid;28
New Article 21(3)(a) (Other Income): other income arising in a
Contracting State and beneficially owned by a resident of the
other Contracting State that is related to the payor of the in-
come may be taxed in the first-mentioned Contracting State in
accordance with domestic law if such resident is subject to a
special tax regime with respect to other income in its Contract-
ing State of residence at any time during the taxable period in
which the other income is paid.29
Special tax regimes in existence at the time a treaty was being
negotiated were to be listed in the Article 3 definitions section of
below will need to be reviewed and, if necessary, finalised in the first part of
2016, which will allow any decision reached on these proposals to be taken into
account as part of the negotiation of the multilateral instrument that will im-
plement the results of the work on treaty issues mandated by the BEPS Action
Plan.”).
26. SELECTDRAFT PROVISIONS, supra note 1, art. 11(2)(c) (Interest), 12(5)(a)
(Royalties), 21(3)(a) (Other Income).
27. Id. art. 11(2)(c).
28. Id. art. 12(5)(a).
29. Id.
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the treaty, together with regimes that each party agreed were
not special tax regimes.30
The U.S. Treasury’s position is that no current provisions in
U.S. law constitute a special tax regime. U.S. Treasury officials
identified a few targets for treatment as special tax regimes, in-
cluding Luxembourg convertible preferred equity certificates
and notional interest deductions for equity in Belgium and Lux-
embourg.31 Notional interest deductions, however, are not
treated as a special tax regime in the U.S. Model. Instead, they
are separately addressed in revised Article 11(2)(e), which states
that the treaty simply will not apply to payments of interest to
a “connected person” that benefits from notional deductions in
the jurisdiction in which the beneficial owner of the interest in-
come is resident.32
In the final version adopted in the U.S. Model, the broad lan-
guage in Article 21 (Other Income) is now limited to guarantee
fees, but the provisions in Articles 11 and 12 are substantially
the same as proposed:
Article 11(c) (Interest): interest arising in a Contracting State
and beneficially owned by a resident of the other Contracting
State that is a connected person with respect to the payor of
the interest may be taxed in the first-mentioned Contracting
State in accordance with domestic law if such resident benefits
from a special tax regime with respect to such interest in its
Contracting State of residence;33
Article 12(2)(a) (Royalties): a royalty arising in a Contracting
State and beneficially owned by a resident of the other Con-
tracting State that is a connected person with respect to the
payor of the royalty may be taxed in the first-mentioned Con-
tracting State in accordance with domestic law if such resident
30. Id. art. 3, at 1–2 (Related Provisions for New Model Protocol).
31. Lee A. Sheppard,Who’s Willing to Sign U.S. Treasury’s New Treaty Pro-
visions?, 148 TAXNOTES INT’L 192 (2015) (quoting Danielle Rolfes, U.S. Treas-
ury International Tax Counsel).
32. 2016 U.S. MODEL, supra note 3, art. 11(2)(e). Notional interest deduc-
tions are deductions allowed for payments made in respect of equity rather
than debt. In effect, notional interest deductions treat certain dividends as in-
terest for tax purposes. Some countries have introduced these deductions in
order to align the tax treatment of companies financed by equity with that of
those financed by debt. The effect is to significantly lower the effective rate of
tax on profits in such countries, especially for companies with equity-intensive
activities such as intellectual property-driven enterprises.
33. 2016 U.S. MODEL, supra note 3, art. 11(c).
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benefits from a special tax regime with respect to the royalty
in its Contracting State of residence;34 and
Article 21(2)(a) (Other Income): a guarantee fee arising in a
Contracting State and characterized as other income by that
Contracting State and beneficially owned by a resident of the
other Contracting State that is a connected person with respect
to the payor of the guarantee fee may be taxed in the first-men-
tioned Contracting State in accordance with domestic law if
such resident benefits from a special tax regime with respect
to the guarantee fee in its Contracting State of residence.35
The definition of special tax regime has become more detailed
and narrower in scope; “related” parties are now “connected”
parties, and some new procedural provisions have been incorpo-
rated.36 A special tax regime is now defined by reference to a
specified list of six conditions, all of which must be met in order
for the regime to be a specified tax regime. The treaty then de-
nies certain treaty benefits to income recipients who are con-
nected to the payor and who are eligible for such a regime.
First, the regime must provide a reduction in the general rate
or base structure for interest, royalties, and guarantee fees, or
for the income earned by companies not engaged in an active
trade or business.37 For interest, royalties, and guarantee fees,
whether the regime is preferential depends on the country’s gen-
eral rate or the general composition of the tax base for income
from sales of goods or services.38
For example, if a country imposes a rate of 14.5 percent on a
certain type of interest when the general rate on income from
the sale of goods is 15 percent, the rate would be preferential. A
drop in the general rate to 14.5 percent would reverse the prop-
34. Id. art. 12(2)(a).
35. Id. art. 21(2)(a).
36. Id. art. 3(1)(l).
37. As discussed above, the targeted income items in the proposed provision
included “other income,” a defined term in Article 21 that includes guarantee
fees. Thus the final language narrows the application of the special tax regime
characterization.
38. 2016 U.S. MODEL, supra note 3, art. 3(1)(l)(i)(A), (B). Distinct from the
proposed provisions, “notional interest deductions” are not treated as a special
tax regime in the U.S. Model. Instead, Article 11(e) states that the treaty will
not apply to payments of interest to a “connected person” that benefits from
notional deductions in the jurisdiction in which the beneficial owner of the in-
terest income is a resident.
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osition. Similarly, a royalty regime would be preferential if it al-
lowed the use of a non-arm’s length transfer pricing method to
calculate a reduced base relative to what an arm’s length method
would produce. For companies not engaged in an active trade or
business in the treaty country, the target is a preferential rate
or permanent base reduction of substantially all income or sub-
stantially all foreign income.39
Second, a reduced rate or base with respect to royalties will
only be considered preferential if the taxpayer’s access to the re-
duction is conditioned on performing research and development
in the country.40 This is a (modest) answer to so-called “patent
box” regimes, which provide a low rate for income earned from
the development of intangibles.41 Patent boxes are no less a
means of tax competition than any other, but they are popular
among OECD countries and thus have been styled as acceptable
tax competition within the BEPS project. Even so, the U.S.
Model’s location-based approach is distinct from the OECD’s ap-
proach because the latter would allow a patent box conditioned
on the taxpayer incurring research and development expenses
in producing the tax-favored income.42
The third condition provides a minimum tax rate floor of either
15% or 60% of the general rate (whichever is lower).43 This does
39. Id. art. 3(1)(l)(i)(C). A footnote in the U.S. Model explains that “in the
case of a regime that provides for both a preferential rate of taxation and a
permanent reduction in the tax base, the rate of taxation would be based on
the preferential rate of taxation reduced by the product of such rate and the
percentage reduction in the tax base.” Id. at 8 n. 1.
40. Id. art. 3(1)(l)(ii).
41. Patent, innovation, or “knowledge development” boxes are regimes de-
signed to attract investment for the exploitation of valuable intangibles, many
of which are developed as a result of research and development expenditures
which may have been financed by other states, including the United States.
42. The OECD has adopted a modified nexus approach to condition the use
of patent box regimes on the taxpayer undertaking “substantial activity” in the
jurisdiction. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. [OECD], COUNTERING
HARMFUL TAX PRACTICES MORE EFFECTIVELY, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT
TRANSPARENCY AND SUBSTANCE, ACTION 5 - 2015 FINAL REPORT 9 (2015) [here-
inafter ACTION 5 FINAL REPORT]. The OECD approach appears to reflect the
issue that location restrictions involving member states may not be compatible
with European law. The U.S. Model language also appears to omit measures
to address embedded intangibles. Future bilateral treaties will likely feature
modified terms as a result of these and other issues.
43. 2016 U.S. MODEL, supra note 3, art. 3(1)(l)(iii), at 8 n. 1 (“For inclusion
in an instrument reflecting an agreed interpretation . . . the rate of taxation
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not appear to call for a minimum rate of 15%; rather, 15% would
be the ceiling at which a rate would be considered a preferential
tax rate; any rate higher than 15% would not be considered pref-
erential even if the general rate is much higher. For example, if
the general rate for interest was 2%, a rate of 1.5% would clear
the hurdle because 60% of 2% is 1.2%. In such a case, the mini-
mum tax floor would be defined as the lower of 15% or 1.2%, thus
1.2%. Conversely, if the general rate was 30%, a rate of 15%
would clear the hurdle despite being half the general rate.
The fourth condition provides that the regime will only be pref-
erential if it “does not apply principally” to a prescribed list of
entities, among which are pensions, charities, and certain pooled
investment vehicles.44 For example, a rate of 5 percent will not
be considered preferential if the rate principally applies to mu-
tual funds that pay out their income annually. It remains to be
seen whether these broad terms will be replicated verbatim in
bilateral treaties going forward.
The fifth condition involves international relations: no special
tax regime exists unless the accusing state consulted with the
ostensibly offending state and thereafter identified the regime
to the offending state through diplomatic channels. For example,
if the U.S. Treasury determined that a treaty partner had
adopted legislation described by the previous four conditions, it
would need to consult with that country and then make a formal
public statement that the law in question was a special tax re-
gime before the characterization would apply.
Finally, the sixth condition is a time delay: thirty days must
pass after the accusing state issues a written public notification
as described in the fifth condition. The waiting period is not
strictly defined as a condition in the treaty but the effect is that,
even if the U.S. Treasury determined that a treaty partner had
adopted legislation described by the first four conditions and
completed its consultation and public notification steps, a re-
gime will not be a tax regime until the following month. This
would presumably grant time for taxpayers to rearrange their
affairs prior to the loss of expected treaty benefits.
shall be determined based on the income tax principles of the Contracting State
that has implemented the regime in question.”). This reflects an issue involv-
ing treaty interpretation that was not addressed in the draft form of the pro-
posed provisions, as discussed infra Part II.
44. Id. art. 3(1)(l)(iv).
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These six conditions address some of the concerns raised by
commenters to the proposed language. Even so, several substan-
tive and procedural questions remain. These will be addressed
further in Part II.
C. Subsequent Changes in Law
The subsequent-changes-in-law proposal is distinct from the
special tax regime proposal in both scope and the administrative
discretion attached to its application. With the subsequent-
change proposal, the U.S. Treasury seeks to switch off not only
the treaty withholding rates provided in Articles 11, 12, and 21
(as it would in the presence of special tax regimes) but also in
Article 10 (dividends) in certain circumstances. Those circum-
stances are described in the proposed new Article 28 as follows:
1. If at any time after the signing of this Convention, the gen-
eral rate of company tax applicable in either Contracting State
falls below 15 percent with respect to substantially all of the
income of resident companies, or either Contracting State pro-
vides an exemption from taxation to resident companies for
substantially all foreign source income (including interest and
royalties), the provisions of Articles 10 (Dividends), 11 (Inter-
est), 12 (Royalties) and 21 (Other Income) may cease to have
effect pursuant to paragraph 4 of this Article for payments to
companies resident in both Contracting States.
2. If at any time after the signing of this Convention, the high-
est marginal rate of individual tax applicable in either Con-
tracting State falls below 15 percent with respect to substan-
tially all income of resident individuals, or either Contracting
State provides an exemption from taxation to resident individ-
uals for substantially all foreign source income (including in-
terest and royalties), the provisions of Articles 10, 11, 12 and
21 may cease to have effect pursuant to paragraph 4 of this
Article for payments to individuals resident in either Contract-
ing State.45
The intent of these provisions seems clear: to deny treaty with-
holding rates on specified income items if a treaty partner re-
duces its corporate or individual tax rate below 15 percent or
switches to a territorial regime. Further, in proposed form, these
provisions were intended to affect the specified type of taxpayer
45. DRAFT PROVISIONS: ARTICLE 28, supra note 1, art. 28(1), (2).
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as a class (corporate or individual, as the case may be). In final
form, the effects are limited to corporations.46
The application of these provisions was not designed to be au-
tomatic. Instead, one party “may” notify the other that it “shall”
(“will” in the proposed version) cease to apply the tax rate stated
in the affected treaty articles.47 If the party does so, the effect is
to deny the treaty-based reduction in source-based taxation
rates as to all companies in both jurisdictions.48
The final form is substantially similar to the proposed version
but is rearranged and shortened owing to the omission of indi-
viduals from its scope. Article 28 reads in full as follows:
1. If at any time after the signing of this Convention, a Con-
tracting State reduces the general statutory rate of company
tax that applies with respect to substantially all of the income
of resident companies with the result that such rate falls below
the lesser of either (a) 15 percent or (b) 60 percent of the gen-
eral statutory rate of company tax applicable in the other Con-
tracting State, or the first-mentioned Contracting State pro-
vides an exemption from taxation to resident companies for
substantially all foreign source income (including interest and
royalties), the Contracting States shall consult with a view to
amending this Convention to restore an appropriate allocation
of taxing rights between the Contracting States. If such consul-
tations do not progress, the other Contracting State may notify
the first-mentioned Contracting State through diplomatic
channels that it shall cease to apply the provisions of Articles
10 (Dividends), 11 (Interest), 12 (Royalties) and 21 (Other In-
come). In such case, the provisions of such Articles shall cease
to have effect in both Contracting States with respect to pay-
ments to resident companies six months after the date that the
other Contracting State issues a written public notification
stating that it shall cease to apply the provisions of Articles 10
(Dividends), 11 (Interest), 12 (Royalties) and 21 (Other In-
come).
2. For the purposes of determining the general statutory rate
of company tax: a) the allowance of generally available deduc-
tions based on a percentage of what otherwise would be taxable
income, and other similar mechanisms to achieve a reduction
in the overall rate of tax, shall be taken into account; and b) a
46. 2016 U.S. MODEL, supra note 3, art 28(1).
47. DRAFT PROVISIONS: ARTICLE 28, supra note 1, art. 28(4); 2016 U.S.
MODEL, supra note 3, art. 28(1).
48. 2016 U.S. MODEL, supra note 3, art. 28(1).
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tax that applies to a company only upon a distribution by such
company, or that applies to shareholders, shall not be taken
into account.49
As in the changes to the special tax rate definition, the revised
subsequent-law change provision revises the minimum tax
threshold to the “lower of 15% or 60% of the general statutory
rate,” which allows for source state rates below 15 percent as
discussed above.50 The final provision also introduces a time de-
lay, but here the delay is six months rather than the thirty days
allowed in the special tax regime provision. The reason for this
marked difference in delay is not indicated in the treaty.
The scope of the subsequent-change-in-law provision is broad.
Unlike the special tax regime, the kill-switch triggered by a sub-
sequent change in law would not only apply to the company that
benefits from the change but would also switch off the treaty
rates for all companies that would otherwise be eligible for
treaty benefits, whether or not they are eligible for the new low
rate. This implies that both parties would override the treaty
withholding rates and impose domestic law rates on the affected
income items. The consultation process introduced in the U.S.
Model suggests that the idea is to negotiate a change to the of-
fending law rather than implement a change to the application
of the treaty. Reciprocity, however, is the prescribed outcome
barring diplomatic “progress.”51
Reciprocity might seem like an unusual policy. If the United
States triggers the kill-switch as a consequence for a treaty part-
ner’s reduction of domestic tax rates on its own residents, U.S.
investors in the country might face the same consequence if the
treaty partner reverts to domestic withholding tax rates that are
higher than those provided in the treaty.52 Where domestic tax
rates on passive income are higher than that available in the
49. 2016 U.S. MODEL, supra note 3, art. 28.
50. See supra text accompanying notes 34–36.
51. 2016 U.S. MODEL, supra note 3, art. 28(1).
52. For example, if, in the context of a treaty between the United States and
State A, the United States invokes the subsequent-changes rule as to a reduc-
tion in the internal corporate tax rate on State A companies, State A companies
with U.S.-source passive income would face domestic U.S. withholding tax
rates instead of treaty rates on that income. State A, however, might then also
impose its own potentially higher domestic rates on specified State A-source
income earned by U.S. companies.
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treaty, the result may not be beneficial to the United States.53
For example, it does not benefit the United States if U.S. resi-
dents pay higher rates of tax to a treaty partner when higher
source taxes would be eligible for credit against U.S. tax.54
U.S. companies might discourage foreign jurisdictions from
adopting a prescribed regime when higher foreign tax rates
might apply to them as a collateral effect and the credibility of
such taxes is not certain.55 On the other hand, the treaty-based
and domestic withholding rates for foreign investment in some
treaty-partner countries may be identical. Denial of a reciprocal
treaty rate would have no effect in such cases, making U.S. in-
vestors indifferent to the kill-switch provisions.
The special tax regime and subsequent-law change provisions
create interesting incentives in terms of creating the means to
pressure foreign governments to align their tax regimes more
closely to that of the United States. But are these wholly new
53. Exceptions to this rule are unusual and may be the product of inatten-
tion. For instance, the 2004 treaty between Sri Lanka and the United States
provides for a maximum withholding tax rate on specified income items that
were higher than the domestic rate in Sri Lanka at the time the treaty was
concluded. In reviewing the agreement, the Joint Committee on Taxation que-
ried whether this was intended, and posited that perhaps Sri Lanka could raise
its rates up the maximum 15 percent, thereby increasing its revenues from
foreign investment. See STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 108TH CONG.,
EXPLANATION OF PROPOSED INCOME TAX TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES
AND THEDEMOCRATICSOCIALISTREPUBLIC OFSRILANKA 62 (Comm. Print 2004),
https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=3523 (noting that
“it is not clear that . . . Sri Lankan laws have been fully taken into account”
since “[s]everal of the articles of the proposed treaty contain provisions that
are less favorable to taxpayers than the corresponding rules of the internal Sri
Lankan tax laws.”).
54. That is, a U.S. company that faces a residual tax rate of 35 percent in
the United States may be indifferent to a foreign tax rate up to 35 percent so
long as it is fully offset by the U.S. foreign tax credit. Accordingly, if State A
taxes at a higher rate under domestic law than under the treaty, and the tax
is fully creditable, the effect is to shift revenue from the United States to State
A.
55. Comparatively high U.S. marginal tax rates are said to make U.S. mul-
tinationals uncompetitive vis-à-vis their foreign counterparts. See, e.g., Off-
shore Profit Shifting and the U.S. Tax Code - Part 2 (Apple Inc.):Hearing Before
the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec.
& Governmental Affairs, 113th Cong. (2013) (testimony of Tim Cook, Chief Ex-
ecutive Officer, Apple Inc.), http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/inves-
tigations/hearings/offshore-profit-shifting-and-the-us-tax-code_-part-2. Level-
ing the global playing field by raising the tax rates on competitors may be a
motivation for favoring increased foreign tax rates on foreign taxpayers.
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features and functions of tax treaties? A textual search of other
treaties suggests not: these kinds of provisions are relatively
rare but not exceptional in the global tax treaty network. Some
precedents are explored in the following Part.
II. NEGOTIATEDOVERRIDE: UNUSUAL BUT NOT
UNPRECEDENTED
A look around the global tax treaty network yields a few exam-
ples of precedent for turning off treaty benefits in the case of
special tax regimes and subsequent-law changes. Scarce relative
to the volume of bilateral treaties based on the OECD, U.N., and
U.S. Models, the examples are mainly confined to agreements
between capital-exporting countries and countries that impose
little or no taxation on income that would be earned from the
treaty partner country. Beyond these agreements are more ubiq-
uitous treaty provisions that may be seen as precedents to the
proposals, namely, some “subject to tax” clauses and, in some
fashion, so-called “saving” clauses.56
To the extent that treaties have been viewed as intending to
eliminate double taxation where two countries seek to impose
taxation on the same income item earned by the same taxpayer,
it is not clear why treaties should exist at all in the absence of
that phenomenon. Exist they do, however. The language limit-
ing treaty benefits, either as to specified taxpayers or specified
types of income, appears necessary to preserve the treaty part-
ner’s tax base, reallocates the taxing jurisdiction back to the res-
idence state where the source state declines to tax. Expanding
this language to the U.S. Model, which implies an intent to in-
troduce these provisions as to most or all future treaty partners,
seems designed to fulfill a distinct function.
Accordingly, it is worthwhile to examine the existing exam-
ples, both in terms of their textual relationship to the proposals
as well as in terms of how they affect the relationship between
the treaty partners. In a search of the U.N. Treaty Series, we
located a number of tax treaties with various provisions that
56. General limitations on benefit provisions are also precedents to some
extent, but they differ from provisions that target specified taxpayers or types
of income in the treaty partner country.
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share characteristics with the special tax regime and subse-
quent-law change mechanisms proposed by the U.S. Treasury.57
Grouped by concept, these are discussed in turn.
A. Special Tax Treatment
Several treaties within the worldwide bilateral tax treaty net-
work contain the term “special tax treatment,” the definition of
which appears to correspond closely to the special tax regime
proposal. These treaties range in date from 1966 through 2000,
but most date to the 1960s and early 1970s and involve a set of
arrangements between France and its former African colonies.58
The most pertinent example, however, is found in the Czech Re-
public-Philippines 2000 tax treaty, which provides:
The provisions of this Convention shall not apply to income de-
rived by companies or other persons enjoying a special tax
treatment by virtue of the laws or administrative practice of
either of the Contracting States as long as the rates of tax ap-
plicable to these companies or persons do not exceed the limi-
tations provided for in the Convention.59
In this treaty, the special tax treatment clause is one of three
clauses intended to prevent treaty shopping and treaty abuse;
the other two provide a general anti-avoidance rule and preserve
the applicability of domestic and general special anti-avoidance
rules, including substance over form.60
57. Treaties were identified by searching a number of terms based on the
special tax regime proposal and subsequent-changes proposals, including “spe-
cial,” “tax regime,” “tax benefit,” “tax treatment,” “holding companies,” “cease
to have effect,” and “relieved from tax.” A complete list of findings is on file
with the authors and available upon request. Not all treaties are included in
the U.N. series, so the analysis is confined to a subset of tax treaties that are
accessible by general search.
58. List on file with the authors. The countries that have treaties with this
language are: Algeria, Benin, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo,
Cote d’Ivoire, the Czech Republic, France, Gabon, Mali, Mauritania, Philip-
pines, Senegal, Togo, and Tunisia.
59. Convention Between the Republic of the Philippines and the Czech Re-
public for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Eva-
sion with Respect to Taxes on Income (as amended by Protocol), Czech.-Phil.,
Protocol, Nov. 13, 2000, 2756 U.N.T.S. 11.
60. Id. (“Benefits provided under this Convention shall not be granted also
to companies of either Contracting State if the purpose of the establishment of
such companies was solely to obtain benefits under this Convention that would
not otherwise be available. The provisions of this Convention shall in no case
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The tax treaties entered into by France and its former African
colonies have similar provisions but do not mention administra-
tive practice. For example, the Benin-France 1972 tax treaty
states:
Where the distributed profits include earnings from holdings
of the company in the capital of other companies and such hold-
ings fulfil the conditions under which affiliated companies are
accorded special tax treatment under the internal legislation
either of the State in which the company has its fiscal domicile
or of the other State, . . . each State shall apply . . . its internal
legislation . . . , while that part of the said distributed profits
which does not consist of earnings from such holdings shall be
taxed by each State in accordance with the manner of appor-
tionment provided for [in the treaty].61
Several similarities associate the proposed special tax regime
clause in the U.S. Model with the special tax treatment provision
found in the Czech Republic-Philippines treaty (less so with re-
spect to the other treaties with this term). First, the special tax
treatment provision clearly contemplates administrative prac-
tice as a source of reduced tax rates.62 In addition, the provision
makes minimum domestic tax rates a prerequisite to eligibility
for treaty-based withholding rates.63 Finally, by implication, the
special tax treatment clause, like the special tax regime proposal
of the United States, denies treaty benefits to recipients of re-
duced tax rates owing to subsequent changes in law in either
contracting state.64
Under the Czech Republic-Philippines treaty and others in the
bilateral treaty network, however, only those taxpayers actually
receiving the reduced domestic rate would be excluded from
prevent either Contracting State from the application of the provisions of its
domestic laws aiming at the prevention of fiscal evasion, in particular, but is
not limited to, the provisions on thin capitalisation, transfer pricing, and sub-
stance over form.”).
61. Tax Agreement Between the Government of the French Republic and
the Government of the Republic of Dahomey (now Benin), Benin-Fr., art.
XV(3), Feb. 27, 1975, 1088 U.N.T.S. 301.
62. As such, the treaty suggests that access to each other’s administrative
practices would be available to the treaty partners.
63. In this case, the stated minimum rate is the treaty rate.
64. It is not clear whether this implication was intended. Research yielded
no evidence that the provision has ever been used by the parties to deny treaty
benefits in response to subsequent-law changes, but it is not clear whether
such evidence, if it existed, would be publicly available.
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treaty benefits; moreover, these taxpayers would be completely
excluded from the treaty rather than only denied the benefit of
targeted provisions (as provided in the special tax regime and
subsequent-change proposals).65
B. Special Tax Benefits
Similar to the special tax treatment clause, several bilateral
tax treaties contain provisions limiting tax treaty withholding
rates where a specified company received a “special tax bene-
fit.”66 These treaties range in date between 1965 (Jamaica-
United Kingdom) and 2003 (Estonia-Malta). The United King-
dom, for example, has six treaties containing the term, while Ja-
maica and Malta each have four.67 At one time, the United
States had a treaty with the Netherlands that contained the
term, but it expressly applied to situations involving the Neth-
erlands Antilles.68 The current U.S.-Netherlands treaty does not
contain a similar term.69
The treaties involving Jamaica provide an illustration. Until
2014, Jamaica had a regime for specified “international finance
companies,” which were entitled to a reduced rate of two and a
65. In addition, the special tax regime provisions only cover payments in-
volving related parties. As such, provisions like that in the Czech Republic-
Philippines treaty compare to a general limitation on benefits provision as
much or more than they compare to the kill-switch proposals.
66. A search of the Hein World Treaty Index yields sixteen treaties with this
text, involving seventeen countries (several are repeat players): Barbados, Bel-
gium, Canada, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Ireland, Jamaica, Latvia,
Luxembourg, Malaysia, Malta, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom,
and the United States.
67. See, e.g., Agreement for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Pre-
vention of Fiscal Evasion, Belg.-Malta, June 28, 1974, 997 U.N.T.S. 49; Can-
ada-Jamaica Income Tax Agreement, Can.-Jam., art. IX, Jan. 4, 1971, 977
U.N.T.S. 183.
68. Convention Between the United States of America and the Kingdom of
the Netherlands with Respect to Taxes on Income and Certain Other Taxes,
Neth.-U.S., art. VI, Apr. 29, 1948, 32 U.N.T.S. 167.
69. This may be because the benefits of the U.S.-Netherlands tax treaty no
longer extend to the Netherlands Antilles.
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half percent on specified profits.70 Jamaica’s treaties with Can-
ada,71 France,72 Sweden,73 and the United Kingdom74 responded
to this nominal rate by denying application of the treaty to com-
panies “entitled to any special tax benefit” under the regime.
A number of treaties exclude specified holding companies from
treaty benefits for the same reason, without necessarily invoking
the language of “special benefits.”75 Most of these treaties in-
volve Luxembourg, including a 1962 treaty with the United
States.76 For example, Article 28 of the Luxembourg-Sweden tax
treaty states:
This Convention shall not apply to holding companies within
the meaning of the special laws of Luxembourg . . . . It also
70. International Finance Companies (Income Tax Relief) Act, § 5(1) (1971)
(Jam.). The law was repealed as of January 1, 2014, with a grandfathering
clause extending tax relief to persons who were granted approval prior to the
repeal until expiration in accordance with the terms of the applicable approval
certificate. See Jamaica – Corporate Tax Credits and Incentives,
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS.COM, http://taxsummaries.pwc.com/uk/taxsum-
maries/wwts.nsf/ID/Jamaica-Corporate-Tax-credits-and-incentives (last vis-
ited Aug. 15, 2016).
71. Canada-Jamaica Income Tax Agreement, supra note 67, art. IX (“This
Agreement shall not apply to companies entitled to any special tax benefit un-
der the [International Finance Companies (Income Tax Relief) Act] . . .”).
72. Convention Between the Government of the French Republic and the
Government of Jamaica for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Preven-
tion of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, Fr.-Jam., art. 27, Aug.
9, 1995, 2089 U.N.T.S. 3.
73. Convention Between the Government of Jamaica and the Government
of Sweden for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal
Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, Jam.-Swed., art. 28, Mar. 13, 1985,
1427 U.N.T.S. 297.
74. Agreement Between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of Jamaica for the Avoid-
ance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to
Taxes on Income, Jam.-N. Ir.-U.K., art. XVIII A, May 9, 1969, 699 U.N.T.S.
350.
75. Convention Between the Kingdom of Sweden and the Grand Duchy of
Luxembourg for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Establishment of
Rules for Mutual Administrative Assistance with Respect to Taxes on Income
and Capital, Lux.-Swed., art. 28, Mar. 13, 1985, 1409 U.N.T.S. 291.
76. Convention Between the United States of America and the Grand Duchy
of Luxembourg with Respect to Taxes on Income and Property, Lux.-U.S., art.
XV, Dec. 18, 1962, 15 U.S.T. 2355.
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shall not apply to the income which a resident of Sweden de-
rives from such companies or to the capital shares or other se-
curities which that person owns in such companies.77
Provisions like this one are found in other current78 and former
U.S. treaties79 and in a current treaty between Chile and Swit-
zerland.80 These precedents are instructive, though those involv-
ing the United States predate the general limitation on benefits
provisions that are now ubiquitous in all U.S. tax treaties.81
The current Trinidad and Tobago treaty, which dates to 1970,
and the former Finland-U.S. and Iceland-U.S. tax treaties,
which date to 1971 and 1975, respectively, share a virtually
identical article to limit benefits in the case of certain invest-
ment or holding companies. The Trinidad treaty, which is still
in force, states:
77. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, Lux.-Swed., supra
note 75. In some treaties, the residence country agrees to exempt dividends
received by their residents from the treaty partner country; this type of provi-
sion might prevent that result. As such, the provision is distinct from the spe-
cial tax regime provision, which focuses on source-country tax benefits rather
than those offered by the residence country.
78. Convention Between the United States of America and Trinidad and To-
bago for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion
with Respect to Taxes on Income, and the Encouragement of International
Trade and Investment, Trin. & Tobago-U.S., art. 16, Jan. 9, 1970, 22 U.S.T.
164.
79. Convention Between the United States of America and the Republic of
Iceland for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Eva-
sion with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital, Ice.-U.S., art. 27, May 7,
1975, 26 U.S.T. 2004; Convention Between the United States of America and
the Republic of Finland with Respect to Taxes on Income and Property, Fin.-
U.S., art. 27, Mar. 6, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 40. This treaty was replaced in 1989; the
new treaty eliminated Article 27 and added the now standard limitation on
benefits clause. Convention Between the Government of the United States of
America and the Government of the Republic of Finland for the Avoidance of
Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes
on Income and on Capital, Fin.-U.S., art. 16, Sept. 21, 1989, T.I.A.S. No. 12,101.
80. Convention Between the Swiss Confederation and the Republic of Chile
for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income and on
Capital, Chile-Switz., Apr. 2, 2008, 2712 U.N.T.S. 91 (denying treaty rates on
specified income items in the case of conduit arrangements).
81. The first U.S. Model to include such a provision was the 1981 version.
U.S. MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION art. 16 (U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY
1981).
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A corporation of one of the Contracting States deriving divi-
dends, interest, or royalties from sources within the other Con-
tracting State shall not be entitled to the benefits of Article 12
(Dividends), 13 (Interest), or 14 (Royalties) if-
(a) By reason of special measures granting tax benefit to in-
vestment or holding companies the tax imposed on such corpo-
ration by the first-mentioned Contracting State with respect to
such dividends, interest, or royalties is substantially less than
the tax generally imposed by such Contracting State on corpo-
rate profits and,
(b) Twenty-five percent or more of the capital of such corpora-
tion is held of record or is otherwise determined, after consul-
tation between the competent authorities of the Contracting
States, to be owned, directly or indirectly, by one or more per-
sons who are not residents of the first-mentioned Contracting
State (or, in the case of a Trinidad and Tobago corporation, who
are citizens of the United States).82
The intention behind these types of special tax benefits provi-
sions aligns with the special tax regime proposal in that it denies
treaty benefits to companies protected against double taxation
by virtue of a domestic tax regime. They are distinct, however,
from the special tax regime proposal in several respects.
First, the special tax benefits provisions appear to target
treaty shopping and, therefore, are concerned with ownership,
while ownership is irrelevant to the special tax regime. Second,
the terms of the special benefits rule appear limited to compa-
nies specified at the time the treaty is concluded, and it is not
clear whether they would be extended to subsequently enacted
regimes.83 There are no references to diplomatic procedures as
there are in the new kill-switch provisions.84 In addition, there
is no role for administrative practice in this type of provision.85
Finally, as in the case of the special tax treatment provision in
82. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, Trin. & Tobago-U.S.,
supra note 78, art. 16. The pertinent text is virtually identical to Article 27 of
the Finland-U.S. tax treaty signed in 1970. Convention with Respect to Taxes
on Income and Property, Fin.-U.S., supra note 79, art. 27.
83. For example, this is the case in Convention for the Avoidance of Double
Taxation, Lux.-Swed., supra note 75.
84. See supra discussion at Part I.B., C.
85. By contrast, the proposed and final text of the new kill-switches contem-
plated the possibility that administrative practice would deviate from statu-
tory prescriptions. See SELECT DRAFT PROVISIONS, supra note 1, arts. 3 (Tech-
nical Explanation for Definition of “special tax regime”), 11(2)(c).
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the Czech Republic-Philippines treaty, the provisions are not re-
ciprocal in scope; only specified taxpayers would be excluded
from treaty benefits.86
C. Subject to Tax
A number of bilateral tax treaties seek to expressly disallow
the application of a treaty where the recipient is not subject to
tax on a given type of income. These provisions are precedents
to the proposed kill-switches because they provide for taxation
not in accordance with the treaty in order to prevent double non-
taxation in specified instances. These provisions do not appear
to have been used or understood to partially terminate or over-
ride treaty terms in the same manner as the special tax regime
and subsequent-law change provisions.
Subject to tax provisions come in various forms. One example
is the so-called “remittance-based tax” clause, which is found in
several treaties and was included in the Commentaries to the
OECD Model in 2003.87 This clause is an answer to double non-
taxation that is created owing to a specific form of territorial tax-
ation under which a country only taxes income that is remitted
or received in the country. The Commentaries to the OECD
Model explain:
Under the domestic law of some States, persons who qualify as
residents but who do not have what is considered to be a per-
manent link with the State (sometimes referred to as domicile)
are only taxed on income derived from sources outside the
State to the extent that this income is effectively repatriated,
or remitted, thereto. Such persons are not, therefore, subject to
potential double taxation to the extent that foreign income is
not remitted to their State of residence and it may be consid-
ered inappropriate to give them the benefit of the provisions of
the Convention on such income. Contracting States which
agree to restrict the application of the provisions of the Con-
vention to income that is effectively taxed in the hands of these
persons may do so by adding the following provision to the Con-
vention:
Where under any provision of this Convention income aris-
ing in a Contracting State is relieved in whole or in part from
86. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, Czech.-Phil., supra
note 59, at 42.
87. A search of treaties in the United Nations Treaty Series yielded thirteen
results of the “remittance-based tax” clause.
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tax in that State and under the law in force in the other Con-
tracting State a person, in respect of the said income, is subject
to tax by reference to the amount thereof which is remitted to
or received in that other State and not by reference to the full
amount thereof, then any relief provided by the provisions of
this Convention shall apply only to so much of the income as is
taxed in the other Contracting State.88
The United States has included remittance clauses within its
general limitation on benefits article (e.g., in the tax treaty with
Malta, which has a remittance regime).89 The language is not in
the existing U.S. Model, nor is it in the proposed revision of the
limitation on benefits clause.90 Remittance clauses are con-
sistent with the special tax regime and subsequent-change pro-
visions, even if existing precedents are distinct.
For example, like the special tax regime and subsequent-
change proposals and unlike special tax benefits and holding
company clauses, the standard remittance clause is broadly ap-
plicable to any person, presumably now or ever. The remittance
clause targets, in general terms, a specific type of tax regime in
order to be broadly applicable. It is silent as to administrative
practice. Finally, consistent with the special tax regime and sub-
sequent-change proposals and unlike a more general limitation
on benefits provision, taxpayers would not be completely ex-
cluded from the treaty under a remittance clause but only denied
the benefit of provisions related to untaxed income.
D. Saving Clauses
Lastly, and perhaps underappreciated for this use, the saving
clause found in most U.S. tax treaties is something of a prece-
dent for using special tax regime and subsequent-change rules
to counter double non-taxation. In U.S. practice, the saving
clause denies U.S. citizens and residents the ability to use U.S.
tax treaties to reduce their U.S. taxes, except as specifically pro-
vided.
88. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. [OECD], COMMENTARIES ON THE
ARTICLES OF THEMODEL TAX CONVENTION art. 1, para. 26.1 (2010).
89. Convention Between the Government of the United States of America
and the Government of Malta for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the
Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, Malta-U.S., art.
22(7), Aug. 8, 2008, T.I.A.S. 10-1123.
90. DRAFT PROVISIONS: ARTICLE 22, supra note 15.
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The clause, found in all U.S. tax treaties, generally states, in-
ter alia, that “[e]xcept to the extent provided, . . . this Convention
shall not affect the taxation by a Contracting State of its resi-
dents (as determined under Article 4 (Resident)) and its citi-
zens.”91 Following prompting from the United States, the OECD
proposed the addition of a similar clause to the OECD Model.92
The main point of a saving clause is to prevent taxpayers from
using tax treaties to reduce domestic taxes in their countries of
residence; but, at least one precedent suggests that the saving-
clause concept may be revised to fulfill a function similar to the
special tax regime. It does so by switching the focus from the
nature of the taxpayer to income and reverting to domestic law
in specified situations of non-taxation by the treaty partner. Spe-
cifically, the Netherlands-Venezuela 1991 tax treaty provides:
When according to the provisions of this Convention income
shall be relieved from tax in the Netherlands, and that income
according to the law in force in Venezuela in considered to be
foreign-source income and for that reason is exempt from tax
in Venezuela, the Netherlands may tax such income as if the
Convention has not come into effect.93
This variation on a saving clause echoes the subject to tax clause
and may ensure that income is taxed in one of the contracting
states if the other declines to tax it. Of course, the ultimate out-
91. 2006 U.S. MODEL, supra note 6, art. 1, para 4.
92. ACTION 6 FINALREPORT, supra note 9, para. 62 (stating the addition of a
saving clause implicates a number of other provisions in a tax treaty). The
OECD further notes that
[d]uring the work on the [saving-clause] provision, a number
of issues related to relief of double taxation were discussed.
It was agreed that, as a matter of principle, . . . the OECD
Model only required a Contracting State to relieve double
taxation when income was taxable in the other State . . . .
[The draft proposal] was put forward during the last stages
of that work in order to confirm that principle.
Id. para. 64.
93. Convention Between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Republic
of Venezuela for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal
Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income (with Protocol), Neth.-Venez., Proto-
col, May 29, 1991, 2288 U.N.T.S. 103.
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come depends on there being an applicable tax according to do-
mestic law in the treaty country seeking to apply the provision
(in this case the Netherlands).94
Again, a saving clause bears some relation to the special tax
regime and subsequent-change provisions, albeit indirectly com-
pared to the foregoing examples. It provides a general reversion
to domestic law in specified cases but not a complete exclusion
from treaty applicability—the taxpayer is still entitled to other
provisions. The Netherlands-Venezuela version is triggered by
the non-taxation of income in the treaty partner country rather
than by the classification of the taxpayer (as the standard U.S.
saving clause provides). Like the special tax regime proposal,
only the affected taxpayer is denied the treaty benefit. There
may be no role for administrative practice, however, since the
provision refers only to the “law in force.”
Thus, although rare in number, a few precedents do exist for
the special tax regime and subsequent-change proposals. These
are but a few examples, as there are likely others within the
broad worldwide treaty network of over three thousand bilateral
agreements. The precedents considered here have arisen in trea-
ties concluded among a range of countries over the years, in dif-
ferent guises and for varying purposes. Contextualized, the U.S.
Treasury’s special tax regime and subsequent-change proposals
should be seen as adding a variation to existing safeguards ra-
ther than a wholly new approach. Even so, the implications of
making these provisions standard should be analyzed. A few of
the implications are discussed in the next Part.
III. IMPLICATIONS
In the introduction, this article posited that a kill-switch is a
useful mechanism to avoid a potentially more problematic out-
come, but that does not mean that a kill-switch is without its
own issues. The U.S. Treasury’s idea of adding partial termina-
tion provisions to address special tax regimes and subsequent
changes in law appears potentially motivated to accomplish two
goals: first, to endorse some version of the single tax principle
(at least, more clearly than has been accomplished in the past)
and second, to forestall some other outcome in the event of the
adoption by a treaty partner of an offending regime, including
94. If not, double non-taxation would seem to occur with or without the
treaty.
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full termination and new treaty formation. The reasons for
avoiding these outcomes likely include international diplomatic
and political considerations as well as internal political proce-
dural ones. These issues and motivations are worth understand-
ing for the purpose of considering whether the kill-switch mech-
anism represents a new vision for the U.S. Model treaty.
A. Endorsing the Single Tax Principle
Denial of treaty benefits to specified taxpayers in regards to
specified-income types makes sense if a goal of a tax treaty is to
prevent double taxation rather than to eliminate taxation alto-
gether. The question, which currently is being developed by the
OECD in connection with the BEPS proposal, is whether this is
or should be the goal of tax treaties. This inquiry, together with
all of the treaty-benefit limiting provisions discussed herein,
may be associated with the idea of the “single tax principle,”
which holds that all income should ultimately be taxed once, and
only once. Ensuring that an item of income is only taxed once
may be accomplished by exemptions, credits, and shared alloca-
tion of tax under a treaty.
The single tax principle is controversial both in terms of its
existence as a recognizable principle and in terms of its ac-
ceptance on the merits. Reuven Avi-Yonah has suggested that
the international tax regime is built upon this principle that,
generally, income should be taxed primarily by the country
where it arises.95 Others are more skeptical.96 Nevertheless, the
95. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah,Who Invented the Single Tax Principle? An Essay
on the History of U.S. Treaty Policy, 59 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 305, 309 (2014–
2015) (stating that the single tax principle allocates tax according to the type
of income, such that “cross-border income should be taxed only once at the
source-country rate for active income and at the residence-country rate for pas-
sive income.”). For a complementary view, see Hugh J. Ault, Some Reflections
on the OECD and the Sources of International Tax Principles, 70 TAX NOTES
INT’L 1195, 1195 (2013).
96. For example, Avi-Yonah points to David Rosenbloom, who is also skep-
tical about the existence of an international tax regime, as well as Michael
Graetz, Julie Roin, and Dan Shaviro. Avi-Yonah, supra note 95, at 311; see H.
David Rosenbloom, The David R. Tillinghast Lecture International Tax Arbi-
trage and the “International Tax System,” 53 TAX L. REV. 137, 166 (2000) (stat-
ing that “[i]nvoking the international tax system does not constitute an expla-
nation, since that system appears to be imaginary.”).
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OECD is arguably adopting the principle in major respects
through the BEPS Initiative.97
Opponents of the single tax principle provide various argu-
ments against the concept, often in the name of tax policy auton-
omy. An example of this argument that has not been discussed
at the level of the OECD, but which implicates many non-OECD
countries, is that the single tax principle would eliminate certain
types of (non-OECD approved) tax incentive structures even
while preserving the prerogatives of OECD members in protect-
ing their own incentive regimes. For instance, the single tax
principle enforced by treaty might signal a consensus against tax
sparing even if it would apparently not interfere with other in-
centives like the patent box regimes becoming so popular in
OECD countries.
Tax sparing refers to the practice by which treaty partners
seek to ensure that tax incentives granted to their resident in-
vestors by source countries are not “cancelled out” by residual
income taxation in the residence country.98 This is typically ac-
complished through a treaty by ensuring that the residence
country gives credit for the amount of tax that would have nor-
mally been paid to the source country instead of a reduced (or
eliminated) amount that was actually paid according to an in-
centive scheme.99
97. See, e.g., ACTION 6 FINAL REPORT, supra note 9; see also ORG. FOR ECON.
CO-OPERATION & DEV. [OECD], PUBLIC DISCUSSION DRAFT, BEPS ACTION 6:
PREVENTING THE GRANTING OF TREATY BENEFITS IN INAPPROPRIATE
CIRCUMSTANCES (2014).
98. Tax sparing was first proposed in the United Kingdom by the British
Royal Commission, which prepared a report in 1953 recommending the policy
as a means of “aiding British investment abroad.” ORG. FOR ECON. CO-
OPERATION & DEV. [OECD], TAX SPARING: A RECONSIDERATION 15 (1998). Ulti-
mately rejected after several years of debate, the policy was nevertheless in-
troduced in U.K. tax treaties as a result of legislative action in 1961.
99. For an overview, see Richard D. Kuhn, United States Tax Policy with
Respect to Less Developed Countries, 32 GEO.WASH. L. REV. 261, 262–64 (1963).
For calls to continue the policy, see Karen B. Brown, Missing Africa: Should
U.S. International Tax Rules Accommodate Investment in Developing Coun-
tries?, 23 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 45, 80 (2002); Damien Laurey, Reexamining
U.S. Tax Sparing Policy with Developing Countries: The Merits of Falling in
Line with International Norms, 20 VA. TAX REV. 467, 483–84 (2000) (arguing
that developing countries “need tax holidays to attract foreign investment,”
and therefore advocating for tax sparing to counter the effect of residual home
country taxation).
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An example of treaty-based tax sparing is found in Article 21
of the 1993 tax treaty between Indonesia and the United King-
dom, which states: “For the purposes of paragraph (1) of this Ar-
ticle, the term “Indonesian tax payable” shall be deemed to in-
clude any amount which would have been payable as Indonesian
tax for any year but for an exemption or reduction of tax granted
for the year . . . .” 100 In this type of tax sparing provision, an
amount of tax would be credited by a taxpayer’s residence coun-
try in accordance with the standard double tax relief provisions
of the treaty (despite not ultimately being paid to the source
country). Therefore, treaty-based tax sparing purposefully cre-
ates the means for double non-taxation through deliberate coop-
eration of the treaty partners.
As a policy, tax sparing has never been accepted by the United
States as a valid feature of tax treaties precisely owing to its
production of double non-taxation.101 As applied to U.S. tax trea-
ties, the incompatibility of the single tax principle with tax spar-
ing would represent no change in policy.
The situation is potentially more controversial when global-
ized through the OECD in the form of minimum standards or
best practices. Since 1998 the OECD has rejected tax sparing as
a self-destructive form of tax competition,102 yet the selective-
ness of attention to this issue has the disadvantage of appearing
100. Agreement Between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia
for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with
Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital Gains, Indo.-N. Ir.-U.K., Apr. 5, 1993,
2038 U.N.T.S. 303.
101. As well as for its violation of the principle that treaties should not be
used to reduce domestic taxation of U.S. persons. For a discussion, see Chris-
tians, supra note 4. Tax sparing was contemplated and even proposed for in-
clusion in one treaty (with Pakistan), but it was ultimately rejected by the
United States, largely due to the vigorous opposition of Stanley Surrey. See
Stanley S. Surrey, The Pakistan Tax Treaty and “Tax Sparing,” 11 NAT’L TAX
J. 156, 167 (1958). For a review of the phenomenon, see Kim Brooks, Tax Spar-
ing: A Needed Incentive for Foreign Investment in Low Income Countries or an
Unnecessary Revenue Sacrifice, 34 QUEEN’S L.J. 505 (2009). For an argument
that tax sparing increases foreign direct investment and its withdrawal is as-
sociated with increased foreign aid, see Céline Azémar & Dhammika Dhar-
mapala, Tax Sparing, FDI, and Foreign Aid: Evidence from Territorial Tax Re-
forms (Univ. of Chi. Coase-Sandor Inst. for Law & Econ., Working Paper No.
758, 2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2767184.
102. OECD, supra note 98, at 41, 83.
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to disproportionately violate the tax policy autonomy of coun-
tries that are not OECD members.103
B. Without a Kill-Switch, What?
Beyond the general policy autonomy question is a more specific
question of autonomy with respect to the parties to a treaty that
includes kill-switch provisions. A kill-switch might be a viable
alternative to what may be viewed as the most serious conse-
quence of a party’s dashed expectations in an existing treaty,
namely, full termination of the agreement. Partial termination
avoids this more catastrophic result. Total termination, how-
ever, has been a rarity in U.S. tax treaty practice.104
Dissatisfaction with an existing tax treaty between the United
States and one of its treaty partners typically appears to be met
by negotiation of a protocol or a wholly new treaty in due course.
Treaty negotiation and ratification is a lengthy and cumbersome
process that involves diplomacy and power politics and therefore
takes time and administrative effort. An offended party may live
with an unsatisfactory treaty for some time.105 For the same rea-
son, the prescribed diplomatic procedures for renegotiation in
103. Most countries lack tax policy autonomy to some degree or another due
to global economic pressure and geopolitics, but discouraging tax sparing may
be viewed as a more direct interference with the policy goals of non-OECD
countries. See Allison Christians,Global Trends and Constraints on Tax Policy
in the Least Developed Countries, 42 U.B.C. L. REV. 239 (2010).
104. Most U.S. tax treaty terminations have involved terminating the exten-
sions of treaties with Belgium, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and the United
Kingdom to their respective offshore possessions and former colonies. See, e.g.,
Tax Evasion Through the Netherlands Antilles and Other Tax Haven Coun-
tries: Hearing Before the Subcomm. of Commerce, Consumer, and Monetary Af-
fairs of the H. Comm. on Gov’t Operations., 98th Cong. 275–76 (1983); Vincent
P. Belotsky, Jr., The Prevention of Tax Havens via Income Tax Treaties, 17 CAL.
W. INT’L L.J. 43, 67–68 (1987). The United States terminated its treaty with
South Africa for nontax reasons, pursuant to the terms of the Comprehensive
Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986. It reinstated the treaty once the regime was aban-
doned. See Convention Between the Government of the United States of Amer-
ica and the Republic of South Africa for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and
the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital
Gains, S. Afr.-U.S., Feb. 17, 1997, S. TREATYDOC. No. 105-9.
105. In the context of contemporary U.S. tax relations with the rest of the
world, tax treaty negotiation currently involves risk of failure due to internal
politics. This issue may mean that the parties have to live with existing tax
treaties indefinitely, making changes to the U.S. Model immaterial in the
short-term. See, e.g., Patrick Temple-West, U.S. Senator Paul Won’t Budge on
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Article 28 of the U.S. Model may weaken the efficiency of the
kill-switch provisions.106
Thus, the partial termination afforded by a kill-switch may not
be perceived as a remedy to full termination but rather the op-
posite: working indefinitely with a treaty that sacrifices some
policy goals in order to preserve others. Partial termination itself
will equally sacrifice some policy goals in order to preserve oth-
ers. Of course, treaties by their nature represent policy compro-
mises undertaken by the parties. In general, however, these are
negotiated policy compromises. The inclusion of a kill-switch in
the U.S. Model treaty may enable the parties to pressure each
other to effectively renegotiate the treaty while avoiding lengthy
internal ratification procedures (which may encounter potential
internal political barriers).107
C. Interpretation Implications
Finally, a kill-switch raises interpretation and dispute resolu-
tion issues in both international and domestic law. First, a
treaty partner might not agree that a breach has in fact occurred
to justify the override in a given set of circumstances. If not, ac-
tually engaging the switch at some future date could raise issues
of international law, process, and politics, even if both parties
agreed upon the mechanism in principle at the time the treaty
was signed.
Blocking Tax Treaties, REUTERS (June 4, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/arti-
cle/usa-tax-treaties-idUSL1N0OL1J920140604 (describing the stalling of U.S.
tax treaty ratification owing to the efforts of a U.S. senator who objected to
certain features involving information exchange).
106. It remains to be seen how a lack of “progress” in consultation affects the
implementation of these kill-switch regimes. See 2016 U.S. MODEL, supra note
3, art. 28(1).
107. See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 106TH CONG., TREATIES AND OTHER
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE 18
(Comm. Print 2001), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CPRT-
106SPRT66922/pdf/CPRT-106SPRT66922.pdf (“The Constitution is silent on
procedures for modifying or terminating treaties, and agreement has not been
reached between the branches on a single proper mode. The general rule is that
international agreements are to be amended in the same way that they were
made, thus for treaties requiring the advice and consent of the Senate. With
the increase in numbers and complexity of treaties, more frequent changes and
adjustments have become necessary. The Senate has again been challenged to
be vigilant for unilateral executive branch action that might change a basic
obligation agreed to in its advice and consent to a treaty.”).
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In the case of special tax regimes identified as such in the
course of treaty negotiation, the provision amounts to a simple
carve out. This is not a significant departure from past treaty
practice in the United States, or internationally for that matter,
as illustrated above. As drafted, however, the provisions are not
limited to the regimes agreed to ahead of time and listed in the
definitions. Instead, they would apply to specified future re-
gimes that reduce a described taxpayers’ tax rate for specified
income items relative to the general rate.108
The proposed special tax regime definition and the new inter-
est, royalty, and other income paragraphs are silent as to how
states will make determinations about regimes that are not
identified as special tax regimes during treaty negotiations.109
They are also silent regarding how parties would deal with dis-
putes that relate to the characterization of a regime as a special
tax regime. The fact that a special tax regime would apply in
response to an administrative practice creates some detection
difficulty, since the United States would not necessarily have ac-
cess to a treaty partner’s relevant taxpayer-specific rulings.110
Implementation of the OECD’s recommendations for countries
to begin sharing tax rulings on an automatic basis may lend as-
sistance in this regard.111
108. In proposed form, it was not clear whether notice would be given to tax-
payers and withholding agents as to the change in rate. In July 2015 IRS In-
ternational Tax Counsel Danielle Rolfes stated that the special regime defini-
tion would not be self-executing, and that the treaty partners “would be able
to agree that a particular regime is not a special regime.” Sheppard, supra note
31. The final versions in Article 28 of the U.S. Model treaty address this issue.
109. It is not clear what would happen in a case of disagreement among
treaty partners as to a future characterization of a special tax regime.
110. The so-called “Lux Leaks” whistleblower revealed that delivering tax
benefits through administrative rulings was a widespread practice. For a dis-
cussion, see Allison Christians, Lux Leaks: Revealing the Rule of Law, One
Plain Brown Envelope at a Time, 76 TAXNOTES INT’L 1123 (2014). The OECD’s
response is automatic exchange of tax rulings. See ACTION 5 FINALREPORT, su-
pra note 42, at 45–54; see also ACTION 6 FINAL REPORT, supra note 9.
111. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. [OECD], MANDATORY
DISCLOSURE RULES, ACTION 12 - 2015 FINAL REPORT 79–82 (2015) [hereinafter
ACTION 12 FINAL REPORT] (noting that “[t]he transparency framework devel-
oped by the Forum on Harmful Tax Practices in the context of the work on
Action 5 requires the compulsory spontaneous exchange of information in re-
spect of rulings that could give rise to BEPS concerns in the absence of such
exchange,” and describing the need for tax administrations to share infor-
mation gleaned from expanded mandatory disclosure rules as a two-step
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The subsequent-change proposal similarly invokes interpreta-
tion issues, particularly since discretion is a threshold to imple-
mentation. The likelihood arises that this provision is meant to
encourage second thoughts by treaty partners rather than to be
applied in fact. Given the dramatic impact of triggering the kill-
switch, notification and negotiation to forestall such an event are
to be expected. While the proposals were largely silent on these
issues, the final provisions in the U.S. Model treaty reflect re-
finement in the approach.112
In a sense, this kill-switch resembles the early view of manda-
tory binding arbitration in the case of mutual agreement proce-
dure failures, and it raises similar issues regarding the expan-
sion of power of competent authorities. Binding arbitration was
originally designed and intended to motivate negotiated settle-
ment among competent authorities rather than as a new insti-
tution upon which governments expected to rely on for substan-
tive decision-making on tax treaty disputes.113 The seriousness
of consequences and discretionary nature of the subsequent-law
change provision suggest that a similar intention may motivate
its inclusion in the U.S. Model. If so, this provides additional
tools to competent authorities to make decisions without over-
sight and involvement of lawmakers and without much public
scrutiny. Given how much leeway is already exercised by com-
petent authorities in applying international tax law, this expan-
sion of administrative power is noteworthy.114
framework, in which “in the first step some basic information on the ruling and
to whom it relates would be provided to another tax authority in accordance
with the governing legal instrument; in the second step the receiving tax au-
thority could ask for further information if this was foreseeably relevant to the
tax affairs of their taxpayer.”).
112. See supra discussion at Part I.B., C.
113. See, e.g., Allison Christians,HowNations Share, 87 IND. L.J. 1407 (2012)
(“[I]nternational tax arbitration is claimed by its designers to be a threat ra-
ther than a promise. Its intended role is as a stick to compel competent author-
ities to come to agreement reasonably and in a timely manner. The prospect of
arbitration is meant to ‘keep governments honest’ in their competent authority
dealings with each other. The role of arbitration in international taxation is
thus not to independently resolve tax disputes but rather to act as a means of
forcing recalcitrant competent authorities to resolve these disputes them-
selves.” (internal citations omitted)).
114. For a discussion of the complex and under-studied role of the competent
authority in international tax law, see id.
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Responding to concerns regarding the proposed language, one
official suggested that the U.S. Treasury intended the conse-
quences of violating new Article 28 to be dramatic because re-
ducing a nation’s basic tax rate below 15 percent would repre-
sent a fundamental tax policy change.115 The United States may
have been signaling an implicit policy against entering into com-
prehensive tax treaties with countries in which the general in-
dividual or corporate tax rate falls below 15 percent.116 The final
versions of the kill-switches, however, provide a more flexible
“lower of” standard that would appear to tolerate rates far below
15 percent, conditioned on a prescribed deviation from the “gen-
eral” rate of no more than 60 percent.117
The more flexible standard avoids confronting difficulties
posed by setting a global minimum floor of 15 percent. The strict
floor contemplated in the proposed provisions could have af-
fected international tax cooperation with many long-standing
treaty partners. Ireland—a country that the United States has
had a tax treaty with since 1949—serves as an example.118 The
general corporate tax rate on active income in Ireland is cur-
rently 12.5 percent,119 and the country is considering adopting a
115. Quyen Huynh, Att’y-Advisor, Off. of Int’l Tax Couns., U.S. Dep’t of the
Treasury, Remarks at Meeting of the American. Bar Association, Sept. 22,
2015 (on file with the author).
116. Since tax treaties are largely motivated by multinational interests, the
denial of benefits only to individuals may not impact the willingness of the
United States to conclude tax treaties. For a discussion of the motivations that
drive the U.S. Treasury to conclude tax treaties, see Christians, supra note 4;
The Japanese Tax Treaty and the Sri Lanka Tax Protocol: Hearing Before the
S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 108th Cong. (2004) (statement of Barbara An-
gus, International Tax Counsel, Department of the Treasury), http://www.for-
eign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/AngusTestimony040225.pdf; Sheppard, supra
note 31 (“[T]he United States signs commercial agreements and tax treaties
with pretty much anyone so that its multinationals can do business more eas-
ily. They go in first – it was always understood that the U.S. military protected
their commercial interests. If they want a tax treaty, they get one.”).
117. See supra text accompanying notes 34–36, 46.
118. Convention Between the Government of the United States of America
and the Government of Ireland for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the
Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital
Gains, Ir.-U.S., July 28, 1997, 2141 U.N.T.S. 167.
119. Corporation Tax, REVENUE.IE, http://www.revenue.ie/en/tax/ct/in-
dex.html (last visited Aug. 16, 2016). The 12.5 percent rate applies to “trading
income,” which is generally active business income. Non-trading income (in-
vestment income) is subject to a rate of 25 percent. The special-tax regime pro-
posal targets passive income tax rates below 15 percent, and thus would not
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6.25 percent rate for profits earned from “knowledge develop-
ment.”120 Ireland is not the only example. Firms from the United
Kingdom that are eligible for patent box treatment would be sub-
ject to a central general corporate rate of 10 percent, well below
the 15 percent floor.121
Other OECD countries including Germany (with a 15.83 per-
cent central general corporate rate), Slovenia (17 percent), Czech
Republic, Hungary, and Poland (each at 19 percent) would all be
close to the floor.122 Canada, a high-tax neighbor that has had a
treaty relationship with the United States since 1942,123 has also
reduced its general corporate tax rate over the years to the cur-
rent central government general rate of 15 percent.124 Gradual
reduction of the general corporate tax rate is indeed an OECD-
affect Ireland. It is not clear, however, whether maintaining a higher rate for
investment income would prevent application of the proposed subsequent-
change provision.
120. GOV’T OF IRELAND, DEP’T OF FIN., FINANCE BILL 2015: EXPLANATORY
MEMORANDUM 7 (2015), http://www.finance.gov.ie/sites/default/files/Fi-
nance%20Bill%20Expl.%20Memo%202015.pdf (explaining that a law adopted
in late 2015 “introduces a corporation tax relief known as the Knowledge De-
velopment Box, in line with the OECD’s modified nexus approach to preferen-
tial tax regimes. The Knowledge Development Box provides that profits from
patented inventions and copyrighted software (qualifying assets) earned by an
Irish company can, to the extent it relates to Research and Development (R&D)
undertaken by that company, be effectively taxed at a rate of 6.25 per cent.”).
121. Corporation Tax: The Patent Box, GOV.UK, https://www.gov.uk/guid-
ance/corporation-tax-the-patent-box (last visited Aug. 16, 2016). International
Tax Counsel Danielle Rolfes stated that “royalty payments to patent boxes that
require substantial activities would be excused from the special regimes sanc-
tion,” and that the U.S. Treasury may adopt the OECD nexus-based test “if we
like it.” Sheppard, supra note 31. For the OECD test, see ACTION 5 FINAL
REPORT, supra note 42, at 9 (explaining that the nexus approach “allows a tax-
payer to benefit from an IP regime only to the extent that the taxpayer itself
incurred qualifying research and development (R&D) expenditures that gave
rise to the IP income.”).
122. OECD Tax Database, OECD.ORG, http://www.oecd.org/tax/tax-pol-
icy/tax-database.htm#C_CorporateCaptial (last visited Aug. 6, 2016) (Table
II.1, corporate and capital income tax).
123. Convention Between Canada and the United States for the Avoidance of
Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion in the Case of Income
Taxes, Can.-U.S., Mar. 4, 1942, 56 Stat. 1399.
124. OECD Tax Database, supra note 122. Combined with provincial rates,
the average tax rate is 26.3 percent. It is not clear how subnational tax rates
would factor into the identification of a lowered corporate tax rate under the
subsequent-change proposal.
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wide phenomenon.125 Inclusion of a strict floor in the U.S. Model
might have been a significant development.
Perhaps such a development would have been appropriate. A
reduction in general tax rates below 15 percent instead might
signal that a treaty partner is more appropriately a tax infor-
mation exchange agreement (TIEA) partner instead—which
would indicate that the United States would want to obtain in-
formation from that country rather than grant its residents a tax
reduction. Normally, a significant change in policy would war-
rant treaty renegotiation, but the U.S. Treasury might wish to
avoid this result, especially if there are domestic political obsta-
cles to treaty ratification (as has been the case for the past sev-
eral years).126 While TIEAs are arguably easier to accomplish in
terms of internal ratification procedures, countries that long
have had a comprehensive tax treaty relationship with the
United States might be unwilling to reduce the relationship to
one only involving information exchange.127
CONCLUSION
Introduced as a blanket U.S. policy to prevent general tax
treaty abuse, kill-switches highlight a real-time policing func-
tion in U.S. tax treaties, explicitly constructing reflexive re-
sponses to certain forms of tax competition. Even if meant to
prevent other problems, embedding a kill-switch in a treaty
raises multiple international and domestic law issues. The use
of such provisions creates distinct legal, procedural, and political
pressures in the tax-treaty relationship that implicate treaty ne-
gotiation, ratification, interpretation, and dispute resolution.
Kill-switches also communicate a defensive tenor in the tax
treaty relationships among many countries. Their introduction
in the U.S. Model reflects the steady deterioration of tax treaties
125. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. [OECD], TAX REFORM TRENDS IN
OECD COUNTRIES (2011) (“The trend towards a reduction of corporate income
tax rates started with the tax reforms in the United Kingdom and the United
States in the mid-1980s which broadened the tax base (e.g. by making depre-
ciation allowances for tax purposes less generous) and cut statutory rates. Cor-
poration tax rates have continued to be cut in recent years.”); see also OECD
Tax Database, supra note 122.
126. See supra note 110.
127. For a brief overview of the ratification process for TIEAs as opposed to
tax treaties, see Allison Christians, The Dubious Legal Pedigree of IGAs (and
Why It Matters), 69 TAXNOTES INT’L 565 (2013).
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from essentially diplomatic documents premised on the good
faith of the parties to detailed contracts drafted in anticipation
of the opposite.
The kill-switch has been a relatively rare, if not interesting,
feature in the international tax landscape. Its inclusion in the
U.S. Model Tax treaty maymake it a recurring feature and bring
some attention to it by administrators, jurists, and scholars.
There is limited but directly relevant contemporary precedent
for this function, so far with little discussion or controversy in
global discourse. That may be due to inattention owing to infre-
quency of use. At minimum, the provisions express some version
of the single tax principle and involve monitoring and peer pres-
sure more overtly than has been seen in the past. This might not
signal a wholly new vision for tax treaties, but it does seem to
reflect a shift in how willing the United States is to mandate
minimal tax standards in its treaties.
